COMMENTARY
The Role of Judges in Life/Death Decisions for the Neurologically Impaired H. Richard Beresford, MD, JD
The Massachusetts supreme court has recently ruled that decisions about withholding care from hopelessly ill, legally incapacitated patients must be made by judges. I t clearly rejected the view t h a t families and attending physicians should be empowered to make such decisions. In this respect, the ruling contrasts with that of the Qlriulan case and highlights the issue of whether judges or physicians and families are better able to make medically and morally sound decisions respecting this class o f patients.
Beresford H R T h e role of judges in life/death decisions for the neurologically impaired. The probate judge ordcrccf thar chemothcrapv be withheld, although hc conceded that it might prolong life and that most cornpetcnt and informed persons with analogous leukemias elect t o receive it. He considercd that the patient's age, his inability to cooperate in treatment. the likelihood of distressing side-effects, the low probability of remission, and the dubious quality of life if remission were obtained outweighed any possible therapeutic benefits. The judge then asked the state supreme court t o determine if a probate court has general authority to issue such an order and if the order in the instant case was correct. The high court answered both questions affirmatively but withheld its written opinion for over a year. In the interval, Saikewicz died of pneumonia, having received no trcatment for his leukemia.
The belated written opinion of the Massachusetts supreme court reasons that because legally competent persons have a constitutional right to refuse medical care, incompctents should be accorded a similar right. Although incompetents have no decision-making power, the doctrine of substituted judgment enables lawfully appointed guardians and judges to act on their behalf. The guardian's role is to try to ascertain the incompetent's preferences; but, if these preferences arc unknowable, the guardian should Jetermine what choice a reasonable person in the incompetent's situation would make. In the court's view, the mcdical evidence supported the guardian's conclusion that a reasonable person in Saikcwicz's position would decline treatment. It cautioned, however. that its ruling should not be read as a devaluation of Saikcwicz's life, even though his impaired cognition was a factor in weighing the rcasonableness of treatment.
Having concluded that withholding life-prolonging care may be appropriate in some cases, the court prescribed a judicially oriented procedure for making decisions. Thus, in the event a question arises as to whether to withhold care from an incompetent person, a petition must be filcd with a probate court for appointment of a guardian. Once appointed, the guardian must make a thorough investlgation , the number of cases potentially subject to the court's ruling is not inconsiderable, and only a well-staffed, medically sophisticated, highly efficient probate court system could effectively handle them. If the Massachusetts supreme court envisions a narrower scope for its ruling, then at some future time it will need to spell out more precisely when the jurisdiction of the probate court must be invoked. In the meantime, Massachusetts physicians and families must either go to c o u n if they wish to withhold care from hopelessly ill and legally disabled patients, or else quietly evade the mandate of the court's decision and risk civil or criminal liability. As with the Quinkan decision, the impact of Saiknvirz in other states is unpredictable. A striking aspect of the Saiknuin opinion is the court's distrust o f private decision-making by attending physicians and families, whether or not it is buttressed by the opinion of an "ethics committee." Why the court thinks that judges are more likely to make correct decisions than those most intimately concerned with an ill person does not clearly emerge from its opinion. Perhaps it believes that judges have more refined ethical sensitivities than physicians, or that families may have nonaltruistic motives for withholding treatment from a hopelessly ill person. The "gravitational effect" [3] of Saikewirz may therefore depend on how lawmakers elsewhere weigh the comparative abilities of judges, on the one hand, and physicians and families, on the other, to arrive at medically and morally defensible decisions. As Professor Goldstein has suggested, because no objectively right o r wrong answer exists in these cases, there is no compelling reason to prefer judicial decisions to private agreements [4].
Both Quinlan and Saikewin assume a societal consensus about the rightness of allowing some hopelessly ill persons to die. Where they differ is in the choice of decision-maker. Quinhn would leave the decision to family, physicians, and a committee; Saiknvin places the responsibility on a probate judge. Other alternatives are to make physicians the primary decision-makers, to allow physicians and families to decide without the intervention of a committee o r a court, or to allow families alone to decide once they have received an unequivocally hopeless prognosis from an attending physician. If the Qainlan and Saiknvicz courts accurately interpret the public will, it would be unthinkable to issue a blanket prohibition against withholding presump tively futile treatments from the legally disabled.
Because more litigation about withholding care from the hopelessly ill is likely, legislation may be helpful [I] . Such legislation might specify the types of cases in which withholding care may be considered and establish a procedure for decision-making. It could identify the decision-makers. define the role of comminees or panels. and provide for access to the courts in the event that a prescribed procedure fails to produce agreement on the level of care. If the legislation permits private decision-making, it could explicitly protect the participants from any civil or criminal liability.
The alternative to legislation is more judge-made law. If Saikewin is any portent. the trend may be to increase the role of judges in specific decisions about levels of medical care. If this pattern indeed develops, one would hope for judges who are both skilled evaluators of medical data and good moral philosophers. One would also hope that they are capable of exercising these talents in situations which call for very prompt decisions. But even if such judges are abundant, the question will remain why they are better suited to decide when to stop medical care for the hopelessly ill than persons who are more knowledgeable about prognosis or more passionately involved in the ill person's fate.
